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1.	 Introduction
The central argument in this paper is that, for the past 
two decades, state-led agricultural extension in Ethiopia, 
implemented by excluding other players in general and 
non-state actors in particular, has facilitated uncontested 
control of the public space by the incumbent Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). In 
addition to its presumed economic ramifications, the 
ongoing agricultural extension scheme that is a major 
component of transforming smallholder agriculture 
is driven by political imperatives aimed at effectively 
controlling the bulk of the Ethiopian electorate whose 
votes in periodic elections are crucial to the regime’s 
perpetuation in power. 
In this vein, I argue that the urge for effective control 
of the majority among the electorate is necessitated by 
the existence of potential and actual threats to regime 
survival as indicated below: 
• The Tigray People’s Liberation Front that 
played the crucial role in ousting the 
previous military dictatorship and which is 
now at the heart of the EPRDF government 
has its origin and support in Tigray region 
with a population of less than 5 million in 
a country of 80 million. Even in Tigray itself, 
local constituencies are contested by other 
protagonists that are inimical to TPLF’s 
policy directions. Hence the vitality of the 
Front cannot be maintained in the absence 
of control and patronage mediated by the 
advantage of incumbency. 
• EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic-based 
regional organizations whose legitimacy is 
highly contested and challenged by other 
protagonists in the regional states of the 
federal system. This necessitated tight control 
and patronage as instruments of survival.
• TPLF/EPRDF is accused by Pan-Ethiopian 
political and social forces of abandoning the 
unity and territorial integrity of the country 
and of endorsing Ethiopia’s dismemberment 
by facilitating Eritrea’s secession and elevating 
ethnicity as an overriding organizing principle 
of political life. 
• Threats from armed separatist groups, like the 
Ogaden National Liberation Front in Somali 
and the Oromo Liberation Front in Oromia 
regions, are another factor that prompted 
EPRDF to entrench a system of control and 
patronage.
• The Eritrean threat expressed in hosting 
separatist and unionist movements of various 
persuasions striving to effect regime change 
in Ethiopia could also be taken as one of the 
reasons for EPRDF’s recourse to control. 
• EPRDF’s close cooperation with the west in 
the fight against thriving political Islam in the 
sub-region has also brought it into conflict 
with some radical Islamist movements 
engaged in terrorist activities, for example 
in mainland Somalia. Tight political control 
throughout the country may be seen as a 
means of ensuring that such groups do not 
establish a foothold within Ethiopia. 
• Last but not least, EPRDF’s Marxist-Leninist 
past espousing the role of a vanguard party 
still inherently persists forcing it to emphasize 
control in its management of public affairs. 
Despite the aforementioned, however, it could 
be assumed that control and patronage in a large 
and populous country like Ethiopia characterized by 
numerous diversities, competing claims, and multiplicity 
of incompatible interests could serve only short-term 
goals that cannot endure over a longer period. Cognizant 
of this, EPRDF is striving to bring about economic 
development and improvement in people’s livelihood 
through which citizens would develop stakes in the 
continuity of the system. This is why official government 
declarations repeatedly state that implementation of 
existing economic policies, including those concerned 
with agrarian transformation, would elevate the country 
to the status of a middle-income economy under which 
citizens could be extricated from underdevelopment. 
In this vein, EPRDF believes that a robust middle class 
that subscribes to its socio-economic and political 
programmes as a reliable constituency of support 
by paying allegiance to its drives of transforming the 
Ethiopian political economy and state-society relations 
can be forged in due course. It thus hopes that the 
majority of Ethiopians would develop a sense of common 
belonging expressed in voluntary coexistence within 
the polity. Specifically, EPRDF sees the success of the 
agricultural extension programme as critical to the 
realization of these goals, believing that the resulting 
broad-based agricultural growth would weaken support 
for the forces that are opposed to its dominance and 
survival. Whether such broad-based agricultural growth 
is indeed to be achieved and whether this brings the 
anticipated political benefits are matters to be seen in the 
years to come. In the meantime, it is hard to see any other 
exit strategy for the EPRDF from desisting from its tight 
political control other than that of increasing popular 
support through broad-based growth and prosperity, 
thereby allowing political liberalization. 
As this paper documents, however, this leaves the 
agricultural extension programme playing an important 
dual role as short and medium-term strategies. On the 
one hand, it is a central part of the government’s strategy 
for promoting broad-based agricultural growth whereas 
it functions as a valuable tool for political control and 
mobilization across the country on the other hand. 
For both reasons, the government has made public 
investment in agricultural extension a high priority 
over the past two decades – in contrast to many other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, there may be 
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tensions between the two objectives, with the control 
imperative leading to a less flexible and responsive 
service for farmers, thereby reducing its productivity 
and growth impacts.
The paper contributes to the PEAPA project alongside 
studies of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mozambique and Tanzania. It also draws on research 
for the Africa Power and Politics Programme (www.
institutions-africa.org) which has compared the historical 
and contemporary political economies of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
Data for this study is elicited from different 
complementary sources like key informants comprising 
knowledgeable individuals, former and current 
employees of agricultural offices, experts of vocational 
training institutes, and smallholders engaged in 
agricultural extension schemes. Moreover, relevant policy 
documents and published and grey literature in the form 
of consultancy reports, research papers, edited volumes, 
and journal articles were reviewed and analyzed. 
1.1. Background
With a population of about 80 million, living in a total 
land area of 1.1 million sq km, Ethiopia is the second most 
populous country in Africa (CSA July 2010). It is bordered 
by Sudan in the west, Eritrea in the north, Djibouti 
and Somalia in the east, and Kenya in the south. The 
country is home to over 70 ethnic groups characterized 
by diverse cultural, linguistic and religious makeup. 
Notwithstanding its long history of independence, 
Ethiopia stands among the lowest in terms of socio-
economic development indicators. The multi-ethnic 
character of Ethiopia’s population is reflected in the 
incumbent constitution that provided for a form of 
government characterised by ethnic federalism on the 
part of formally self-governing regional states. Ethiopian 
history over the last four decades in particular is replete 
with episodes of recurrent drought and cyclic famine 
plus sporadic interstate conflicts. Diversities expressed 
in high and rugged mountains, plateaus, deep gorges, 
river valleys and plains, contrasting landscape with 
diverse soil types, and a range of agro-ecological zones 
(frost, highland, temperate, lowland and desert) form the 
physiographic setting of the polity. The central highlands 
that spread in and around the north-western and south-
eastern massifs separated by the Ethiopian Rift Valley 
accommodate 88 per cent of the human population, 75% 
of the livestock and 95% of the total cultivated land (EEA 
2004/05).
Ethiopia’s agro-ecological configuration is broadly 
divided into five zones where each has its own rainfall 
pattern and agricultural production system.  Most of the 
sedentary agricultural areas are located in the highlands 
while the semi-arid and arid lowlands are dominated by 
agro-pastoral and pastoral production systems.
The role of the agricultural sector and its impact on 
the different aspects of socio-economic life is signified 
	  
Source: Ethiopian Mapping Agency-EMA, 1984
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by its contribution to GDP (46%), source of livelihood for 
the overwhelming majority of the population (80%), food 
supply, and export trade and foreign exchange earning 
(84%). Ethiopian agriculture is dominated by smallholder 
farms that produce the bulk (over 90 percent) of outputs 
for consumption and the market (Zenebe et al 2005). 
Agriculture has a considerable potential for boosting 
the country’s socio-economic development endeavours 
given its varied endowments (Dessalegn et al. 2010: 29). It 
is in view of these that successive Ethiopian governments 
made substantial efforts in agricultural development as a 
priority area of intervention by enacting various policies 
to this end. Nevertheless, performance in agricultural 
production and productivity is frequently bedevilled by 
a host of adversities that have culminated in perpetual 
dependence on food aid for sustaining the wellbeing 
of millions of people. Smallholder rain-fed agriculture, 
which is the dominant form of engagement in the sector, 
faced formidable challenges over the years due to the 
entrenched mismatch between low productivity and 
high population growth rate. This is compounded by 
adverse climatic variability contributing to the unfolding 
of crisis in rural livelihood. The fact that the country is 
rated 174th out of 187 in terms of Human Development 
Index (UNDP 2011) indicates the poor performance of 
the sector despite its central role as the mainstay of the 
economy. Notwithstanding this, however, it is claimed 
that the country has registered a double-digit economic 
growth rate over the period 2005/06-2009/10, having 
grown at just over 6% per annum over the period 2000/01-
2004/05 (EEA 2011: 7) allegedly due to, among others, 
sustained performance and increased diversification of 
export commodities. 
The land under cultivation in 2007/08 was 15.7 million 
hectares operated by 13.2 million households (CSA 2008) 
with average per capita holding size per household of a 
little over one hectare. In terms of land use, the bulk of the 
agricultural land (78.9%) is devoted to crop production as 
compared to fallow land, grazing land and land for other 
uses each of which accounts for less than 10%. Crop and 
livestock production is practiced in the different agro-
ecological zones under four distinct farming systems, 
namely the highland cereal production system of the 
north-central and south-eastern highlands, the enset-
coffee-livestock complex of the southern and western 
highlands, the shifting cultivation production system of 
the south-western lowlands, and the pastoral production 
complex in the arid and semi-arid zones (Westphal, 1975). 
In the highlands, plough-culture dominates the cereal 
producing areas where different seasonal crops are 
grown interspersed with livestock production. According 
to Teller, Tesfai and Assefa (2007: 4), the country’s 
population is highly concentrated in the highlands, 
whereas the lowlands are sparsely populated due to the 
prevalence of malaria and other vector-borne diseases 
(ibid.) as well as for other geographical, historical and 
socio-economic reasons (Pankhurst and Piguet 2004: 2). 
As a consequence, population density correspondingly 
varies with altitude. The highest population density is in 
the enset-growing belt covering five geographic zones 
of the Southern regional state. Population density in the 
enset belt ranges from about 340 persons to about 575 
persons/square kilometer (Teller, Tesfai and Assefa 2007). 
In the lowlands bordering Sudan, Kenya and Somalia, 
the variation ranges from 2 to 40 persons per square km, 
which indicates that nearly 80% of the population lives 
in only 37% of the total landmass while the remaining 
20% inhabits 63% of the total land area (ibid).
In the face of a plethora of vulnerabilities resulting 
from heavy dependence on rain-fed agriculture practiced 
through traditional farming techniques, the military 
regime embarked on irrigation development during 
its incumbency (1974-1991). In addition to creating a 
favorable environment for ensuring food security, this 
move was aimed at enhancing import substitution, 
promoting export trade, and expediting planned 
resettlement of food-deficit rural households. However, 
this initiative was not persevered with until the early 1990s 
when increased attention was lent to irrigation schemes 
targeting smallholders as beneficiaries. In the post-1991 
years, small-scale irrigation schemes proliferated in the 
four major regional states (Amhara, Tigray, Oromia 
and SNNPR). It was reported that in 2003, traditional 
and modern small-scale irrigation schemes became 
operational covering 140,000 and 47,000 hectares of 
land respectively (Adugna 2003 cited in EEA 2004/05). 
In subsequent years, large-scale irrigation projects have 
been implemented on the basis of several multi-purpose 
master plans.
Agriculture’s prominence persisted by co-existing 
with small and medium-scale manufacturing and an 
expanding service sector as the major features of the 
Ethiopian economy. Cognizant of the centrality of the 
agricultural sector, the EPRDF regime formulated the 
Agriculture-Led Development Industrialization (ADLI) 
Strategy in the mid-1990s when modernizing traditional 
smallholder agricultural production became the central 
focus. ADLI also formed the basis for the ‘Plan for 
Accelerated and Sustained Development Programme’ 
(PASDEP) implemented between 2005 and 2010 as a 
result of which Ethiopia hoped to realize most of the 
targets enshrined in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). To this end, a well-coordinated support system of 
agricultural extension and agricultural research was taken 
as a means of enhancing opportunities for improving the 
performance of the sector with a view to reducing poverty 
and food insecurity. Other associated goals enshrined in 
the strategy included commercialization of smallholder 
agriculture through product diversification and a gradual 
shift to high-value crops for domestic consumption 
and export. Interventions that are compatible with the 
country’s varied agro-ecological zones were designed by 
taking into account the country’s comparative advantage 
in terms of reliable availability of labour, land and agro-
ecological diversity. The agricultural extension program, 
whose key features include deployment of extension 
workers in all rural grassroots localities (kebeles) and 
assigning them to undertake various activities like 
facilitating the imparting of knowledge and skills to 
smallholder farmers aimed at boosting agricultural 
production and productivity, was deemed necessary. 
Hence agricultural extension is taken as a case study for 
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unpacking the political economy of agricultural policy 
making in Ethiopia. 
Under a situation where smallholder farmers mainly 
engage in production based on traditional knowledge 
and skills, deploying trained extension workers in the 
rural areas was viewed as invaluable. The agricultural 
extension programme emphasized the need for 
enhancing the numerical size and educational level of 
extension workers by providing them with extensive 
technical and vocational training and skills. Since 2004, 
Farmers Training Centres (FTCs) have been established 
to transfer improved agricultural technologies 
and provide adequate services at a closer reach to 
smallholder producers (Yonas 2006b: 53). In addition, 
25 Agricultural Training and Vocational Education 
and Training (ATVET) colleges have been established 
from which tens of thousand extension workers have 
graduated and deployed in almost all the rural areas in 
all the regional states. Following the launching of FTCs, 
millions of farmers have participated in the various 
training packages dealing with crop production, water 
resource utilization and management, and building 
community-level institutions for coordinating activities. 
Thus, the agricultural extension program has witnessed 
a significant increase in the number of extension workers 
as well as introduction of the package1  approach for 
inducing the participation of smallholders on both 
individual and group basis under the supervision and 
guidance of the former (Dessalegn 2008). The number of 
extension workers increased from 2500 in 1995 to 15,000 
in 2002 (MOFED 2006), 25,000 in 2008 (Dessalegn 2008: 
133) and 46,000 by 2010 (Davis et al, 2010). It is intended 
to increase this to 60,000 in the near future. Meanwhile, 
physical construction of around 6500 FTCs had occurred 
by 2009, with around 2400 of these already offering some 
form of training. Ultimately, it is intended to increase this 
to around 15,000, i.e. one for every kebele in the country 
(Davis et.al. 2010).
With the foregoing as backdrop, the political and 
economic dimensions of the agricultural extension 
program as a major focus of agricultural policy making 
in Ethiopia is examined. Inquiry on the subject is 
premised on the hypothesis that ADLI in general and 
the agricultural extension program in particular are 
aimed, among others, at ensuring regime legitimacy 
and acceptance that could lead to the perpetuation of 
the ruling party in power. The other assumption that 
underlies this hypothesis is that the program is designed 
to benefit smallholder agricultural households that have 
significant and multifaceted influence on several aspects 
of the economy.
Smallholder producers are believed to be important in 
politico-administrative terms as they constitute a sizeable 
electoral constituency, source of human power supply 
for regime security and survival, and bulwark against 
internal and external threats. In the light of this, EPRDF 
has sought to retain its support base from the heydays 
of its armed insurgency, which was rooted in smallholder 
farming communities. Moreover, it seems that EPRDF 
has drawn lessons from previous experience whereby 
the fall of both the imperial and military regimes was 
precipitated by the disaffection of smallholders. Hence 
a combination of political and economic imperatives 
served as drivers for embarking on agricultural policies 
and associated programs that cater for the livelihood 
needs of smallholders.
2	 Agriculture	Policy	
Context	and	
Performance
2.1  Overview
Ethiopian Agricultural policy has undergone several 
changes during the past several decades in terms of 
focus and major goals. In all cases, its central objective 
remained to be improvement of agricultural performance 
by creating a favorable environment that could promote 
the drives of the successive regimes that pursued 
different objectives for furthering their legitimacy. In 
what follows, the different paths that agricultural policy 
making in Ethiopia has followed both in the past and at 
present are highlighted.
The imperial regime’s first two Five-Year plans 
(1957-1962 and 1962-1967) heavily favored large-scale 
commercial farms for augmenting agricultural production 
for export in line with the modernization drive that gained 
currency at the time. Increase in production was expected 
to be achieved through accelerated investment in large-
scale farms pursuant to the dominant line of thinking 
of the imperial government (EEA, 2004/05). However, 
the regime underwent a policy shift, emphasizing the 
modernization of smallholder agriculture during the 
Third Five Year-Plan Period (1968-1973). This introduced 
the package project approach (Dejene, 1990), which 
had two variants, namely the Comprehensive and the 
Minimum Package Programs focusing on improving 
agricultural production on farms of individual 
households and organized groups, respectively,  were 
introduced in some parts of the country. The success 
of the Comprehensive Package Program, however, was 
limited because of its high requirements in terms of 
modern agricultural inputs and skilled human power, 
unfavorable land tenure regime, and poor infrastructural 
and market development (EEA, 2004/05). The Minimum 
Package Program too did not entail significant progress 
due to failure in introducing a more dynamic farming 
system drawing on the experiences of smallholders 
(Dessalegn, 2004).
Immediately upon seizing power, the military 
regime (1975-1991) embarked on the socialist path 
of development that geared Ethiopia’s economic and 
political policies and attendant practices to fit to the 
principles of this doctrine. Socialist production relations 
thus prevailed in the workings of the agricultural and 
other sectors of the economy. The military regime 
is famed for introducing radical agrarian changes 
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signified by the Land Reform Act, which was expressed 
in nationalization and equitable distribution of land. 
Besides, peasant associations were established as the 
nuclei of grassroots administration that served as means 
for controlling grassroots and local communities. Other 
reforms introduced for effecting changes in the bid 
for transforming smallholder agriculture included the 
establishment of collective and state farms and producers’ 
cooperatives, which were given privileged access to 
improved inputs and technical services, irrigation facilities, 
productive land, and higher farm-gate prices (EEA, 
2004/05, Brune, 1990). Service Cooperatives were also 
created for facilitating favorable access of smallholders 
to basic goods and services (EEA, 2004/05). Despite the 
intensification of collectivization and cooperativization 
as major features of the agricultural sector and new 
agrarian relations, production declined during most of 
the years of military rule. Critics of the agrarian policies 
of the military regime argued that discrimination by 
favoring collectivization to the detriment of smallholder 
production was the major cause for the steady decline 
in the performance of the sector (Brune, 1990). In this 
connection, a SIDA report stated that ‘the most efficient 
method of quickly stimulating agricultural production 
and increasing marketable grain surplus could have 
been achieved by encouraging smallholder production’ 
(SIDA quoted in Brune, 1990: 25). The military regime 
also introduced two land use policies for expediting its 
resettlement and villagization programmes.
EPRDF’s agricultural policy commenced with the 
introduction of the Agricultural Development-Led 
Industrialization (ADLI) Strategy in the mid-1990s. 
The main arguments made to justify this as an 
overarching economic policy were that improving the 
performance of smallholder agriculture could lead to 
increase in farmers’ income, reduction of poverty, and 
enhancement of production of industrial raw materials 
including marketable surplus (Dessalegn, 2008). The 
government strongly believes that ADLI is the fastest 
way to ensure economic development and recovery. 
However, critics doubt its efficacy by arguing that ADLI 
tends to disregard labor productivity by focusing on land 
productivity despite the fact that the main problem of 
Ethiopian agriculture is low labor productivity (Berhanu, 
2003). Moreover, ADLI allegedly tends to emphasize the 
supply side with little concern for demand in the face 
of low purchasing power of the rural people on the one 
hand and the small size of the urban population on the 
other. Hence it is questionable that increased production 
alone could entail higher farmer income in the absence 
of adequate demand (ibid). Moreover, it is claimed 
that given its fragmented nature and the small size of 
per capita land holding, peasant agriculture cannot 
shoulder the onus of transforming the performance 
of agriculture in a manner that could enable it to play 
pivotal roles in boosting Ethiopia’s development efforts 
as expected. In spite of the aforementioned constraining 
factors, however, EPRDF’s Rural Development Policy 
and Strategy (FDRE 2002) reiterated that the country’s 
overall development should be centered on the rural 
areas where smallholder agriculture is predominant. The 
justification for this is premised on the rationalization that 
the overwhelming majority of the country’s population 
live in the rural areas that enjoy comparative advantages 
in abundant land and labor that can be judiciously 
utilized for ensuring economic growth and sustainable 
development by offsetting the consequences resulting 
from scarcity of capital (ibid: 4).
Dessalegn (2008) observed a change in direction in 
terms of agricultural development, with an increase 
in land allocations to local investors able to cultivate 
on a commercial scale. More recently still, Ethiopia 
has attracted attention as one of the major recipients 
of transnational investment in land (Anseeuw et.al. 
2012). However, the government insists that this is 
complementary to efforts to increase the productivity 
of smallholder agriculture and not a substitute for them.
2.2  Agricultural Performance
In spite of the steady decline in the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010, 
agriculture still remains significant in terms of its 
contribution to GDP particularly when compared to the 
manufacturing sector (Table 1). 
Nevertheless, despite this impressive recent 
agricultural performance, Ethiopia remains heavily 
dependent on food aid. According to WFP/FAO (2010), 
the number of people in need of food assistance was 4.6 
million in May 2008 and rose to 6.2 million in August 2009, 
as high global food prices were transmitted to Ethiopian 
markets. Notwithstanding the claim by official statistics 
Table 1: Percentage Distribution of GDP by Sector at  Constant Basic Prices (%)
Year Agriculture Industry Services
2006/07 46.1 13.2 41.7
2007/08 44.6 13.0 43.5
2008/09 43.1 13.0 45.0
2009/10 42.0 13.0 46.1
Source: http:www.mofed.gov.et/upload/businesspropsal/nationaleconomic
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that Ethiopia’s overall economy has grown rapidly since 
the mid-2000s, in 2008 the country experienced the 
highest rate of inflation in its history that stood at the 
top in the world next to Zimbabwe (CIA, 2009) thereby 
entailing high food prices and growing food insecurity. 
The high levels of food insecurity resulting thereof 
and the aforementioned progressive increase in the 
number of food-deficit people implying rising food aid 
figures illustrate the magnitude of the challenge faced 
by the Ethiopian government in its bid to effect agrarian 
transformation.  Hence the unabated persistence of this 
state of affairs has a potential of inducing a growing 
number of disaffected citizens who may be sympathetic 
to critics of the EPRDF regime thereby leading to the 
forging of a sizeable constituency of discontent that 
forms the basis for the gradual undermining of regime 
legitimacy and survival. In the extreme case, the situation 
could lead to serious consequences resembling what 
transpired earlier culminating in the ouster of the imperial 
government and military rule.
2.2.1 Crop Production
Per capita crop production has grown during the years 
between 2005/06 and 2008/09, albeit at declining rates 
(Table 3), even as population has increased by an average 
of about 2 million per year. The government claimed that 
increase in the size of cultivated area is due to farmers’ 
confidence in its agricultural policy that led to higher 
product prices, bumper harvest resulting from good 
rains, clearing forests and grazing land for cultivation, 
and increased engagement of the youth in farming (EEA, 
2006/07).
 
Despite the increase in cultivated land, however, 
per capita land holding remained very small. Increased 
production during the harvest years in question can 
be largely explained by growth in the supply and use 
of improved inputs that ensured relatively enhanced 
land productivity rather than labour productivity. 
According to EEA (2011: 53), the role of such inputs and 
institutional support services is critical to attain higher 
agricultural production in Ethiopia. By the same token, 
the progressive decline in percentage changes in total 
production  and per capita production can be attributed 
to the rise in the total cost of fertilizer since 2006 thereby 
entailing mismatch between supply and rising national 
demand (ibid: 46).
Despite the increase in cultivated land, however, 
per capita land holding remained very small. Increased 
production during the harvest years in question can 
be largely explained by growth in the supply and use 
of improved inputs that ensured relatively enhanced 
land productivity rather than labour productivity. 
According to EEA (2011: 53), the role of such inputs and 
institutional support services is critical to attain higher 
agricultural production in Ethiopia. By the same token, 
the progressive decline in percentage changes in total 
production  and per capita production can be attributed 
Table 2: GDP Growth Rates by Major Industrial Classification at Constant Basic Price (%)
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total GDP
2003/04 16.9 11.6 6.3 11.8
2004/05 13.5 9.4 12.8 12.7
2005/06 10.9 10.2 13.3 11.8
2006/07 9.4 9.5 15.3 11.8
2007/08 7.5 10.1 16.0 11.4
2008/09 6.4 9.7 14.0 10.1
2009/2010 7.6 10.6 13.0 10.4
Source: http: www.mofed.gov.et/upload/businesspropsal/nationaleconomic. 
Table 3: Volume of Agricultural Production and Cultivated Area (2003/04-2008/09)
Year Production 
(tons)
Area (ha) % change 
production
Population 
in 000
Per  capita 
production 
(kg)
% change in 
per capita 
production
2005/06 13,382,127 10,170,911 12.13 75067 178.2 10.4
2006/07 14,943,201 10,582,054 11.66 77127 193.7 7.5
2007/08 16,116,657 10,954,722 7.85 79221 202.4 4.4
2008/09 17,116,740 11,210,501 6.20 82544 207.3 2.4
Source: CSA, various publications. 
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to the rise in the total cost of fertilizer since 2006 thereby 
entailing mismatch between supply and rising national 
demand (ibid: 46). 
Note that the data in Table 3 refer to the period before 
the main influx of transnational land investments. 
However, data on production from these farms is not 
available and indeed many have yet to start production, 
let alone cultivate the entire area of their allocation. Prior 
to this, Girma (2005) indicated that production from 
medium and large-scale farms was less than 300,000 
tons implying that the bulk of agricultural production 
still originates from smallholder farms.      
Whilst agricultural production has been growing 
rapidly, many still argue that Ethiopian agriculture is 
hampered by the tiny size of most farms. In 2008, 31.3% 
of smallholder producers cultivated less than 0.5 hectares 
whereas 25% undertook production on land size ranging 
between 0.5 ha and 1 ha (Table 4). In spite of the fact that 
small size of land can be productive as evidenced by 
the Chinese experience, studies on Ethiopian agriculture 
show that small farm size remains one of the major 
handicaps militating against efforts towards improving 
productivity (Diao, Xinshen and Nin Pratt, A 2005 cited in 
EEA, 2006/07). The same source revealed that the major 
constraint in ensuring food security in food-deficit areas 
is the extremely small size of farm land (0.57 ha and 1.38 
ha in the food-deficit localities and the surplus producing 
areas respectively). At this juncture, it is worthy to note 
that the military regime’s Land Reform Act of 1975 has 
rendered all land (urban and rural) public property under 
the custody of the state. This policy that made landless 
rural producers eligible to access agricultural land has, in 
a way, contributed to fragmentation of farm plots due to 
equitable distribution measures that were influenced by 
the ideological orientation of the post-imperial political 
order under military rule. 
This was further compounded by the exponential 
increase in the country’s total population in general and 
that of the rural areas in particular, which culminated 
in the further diminishing of family holdings to the 
extent of adversely affecting both land and labour 
productivity. According to Hussein (2006: 147-149), the 
Land Reform Act that prohibited sale and exchange of 
land in every imaginable form was vital in shaping the 
pattern of relations between the state and smallholder 
farmers. Notwithstanding the introduction of a number 
of reforms in some aspects of the military regime’s land 
tenure policy like the right to lease holdings and make use 
of hired labour including issuance of certificates affirming 
use rights of holders since 2003, the EPRDF regime 
persevered with the initiative of its predecessor affirming 
the previous status of land as public property including 
limiting the entitlement of agricultural producers to use 
right without claiming ownership. In this manner, the 
land tenure system became an enduring element that 
entrenched the hegemonic power of the state over the 
peasant producer (Dessalegn 2009: 285).  Merera (2006: 
230) argues that EPRDF’s resistance to the pressures 
exerted by western governments and international 
financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF to 
resolve the anomaly between economic liberalization 
and state control with regard to land (once publicly 
stated as “over EPRDF’s read body”) is prompted by its 
quest to control the peasantry and ensure the continued 
dependence of rural producers on the state for accessing 
this vital resource. 
              
Increase in yield is essential for sustained agricultural 
production. The yield figures for the major crops that 
progressively increased between 2003/04 and 2008/09 
are indicated in Table 5 and Figure 1. Rainfall adequacy, 
timely harvesting, better supply of inputs, and low 
incidence of pest and other crop hazards during harvest 
seasons are reported to entail positive outcomes in 
agricultural production (FAO/WFP cited in EEA 2006/07). 
The amount of yield produced in Ethiopia during good 
harvest seasons, however, is found to be less than a 
quarter of the yield obtained in Asia during the Green 
Revolution including harvests in agricultural research and 
demonstration sites (EEA, 2006/07). This is in line with 
the assertion that variations in agricultural productivity 
across households and countries depend on a variety of 
factors like quantity and quality of conventional inputs 
such as land, labor, fertilizer and machinery (Carig, Pardey 
and Roseboom 1997, Abebayehu and Wiebe 2001). 
2.2.2. Livestock Production
There is paucity of accurate and up-to-date data on 
livestock production and productivity. CSA provides 
estimates of annual production of milk, eggs and honey 
but no data on meat production is made available. In 
2008/09, cow and camel milk production was estimated 
to be 2.7 billion liters and 162.1 million liters respectively. 
According to the same source, honey production was 
39.6 million kg whereas the figure for egg production 
stood at 79.1 million during the same year.
Despite the sizeable animal population for which the 
country is famed, the livestock sub-sector is marked by 
low productivity and low production (Azage cited in 
Table 4: Farm Size in ha, percentage of 
holders, and average holding (2008).  
Farm size 
(hectare)
Per cent of all 
holders (%)
Average area/
holder (ha)
Under 0.10 4.95 0.04
0.10-0.50 26.36 0.24
0.51-1.0 25.34 0.6
1.01-2.0 26.58 1.16
2.01-5.00 15.48 2.24
5.01-10.00 1.22 4.36
Over 10.0 0.07 8.22
Total 13,254,840 0.93
Source: CSA, 2008, statistical bulletin no 417, p.13
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EEA, 2006/07), which is evidenced by shortfalls in supply 
that failed to match increasing demands for livestock 
products. 
3.		 Distinctive	Features	of	
the	Political	System	
and	Implications	for	
Agricultural	Policy	
3.1  Introduction 
The EPRDF, whose formation in 1989 was spearheaded 
by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), came to 
power in 1991 following its successful prosecution of over 
a decade and a-half of armed struggle against the military 
regime of President Mengistu. EPRDF is a coalition of 
four ethnically-based resistance groups whose leading 
members like the incumbent head of government (the 
Prime Minister) play infl uential roles in the workings 
of the present Ethiopian political system since the 
demise of the military dictatorship. EPRDF managed 
to build a robust constituency of support in the rural 
areas of north and central Ethiopia by rallying behind 
it broad sections of farming communities that were 
antagonized by the oppressive policies and attendant 
practices of the military regime. It also entered into a 
“deal” with the Eritrean Liberation Front (EPLF) that 
spearheaded the processes that culminated in the de 
facto and de jure secession of Eritrea in 1991 and 1993 
respectively. Moreover, the elevation of ethnic rights to 
self-determination as a sacrosanct organizing principle 
in state-society relations and a major feature of the 
political landscape in post-1991 Ethiopia under EPRDF 
rule heightened ethnic awareness due to the nature of 
resistance against military rule. The secession of Eritrea 
also served as a source of inspiration for other armed 
groups some of which like the OLF and ONLF still seek 
independence for the regions and ethnic groups they 
Table 5: Yield in Major Crops in tons per hectare (2003/04-2008/09)
Year Teff Barley Wheat Maize Sorghum
2003/04 0.843 1.173 1.469 1.86 1.357
2004/05 0.948 1.212 1.557 1.719 1.369
2005/06 0.969 1.273 1.520 2.187 1.481
2006/07 1.014 1.327 1.671 2.229 1.582
2007/08 1.167 1.376 1.625 2.122 1.734
2008/09 1.220 1.554 1.746 2.224 1.736
Source:  CSA 2008/09 . 
Table 6: Livestock Products (2005/06-2008/09)
Year Cow milk (billion lit) Camel milk (million 
lit)
Honey (million kg) Eggs  (mil.)
2005/06 2.32 95.7 41.5 67.4
2006/07 2.63 114.18 51 81.7
2008/09 2.7 162.1 39.6 79.1
Source:  Ibid. 
Source: Ibid	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claim to represent. Besides, the deal between the ruling 
liberation movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea, namely 
EPRDF and EPLF respectively, led to acrimony among 
many Ethiopians who lamented the dismemberment 
and land-lockedness of the country resulting thereof. 
Subsequently, the honeymoon between the two came 
to an end in 1998 and resulted in a fully-blown hostile 
relationship over a range of issues rooted in the unsettled 
terms of Eritrea’s secession associated with issues like 
the undemarcated common border and divergence of 
economic policies (Plaut 2004, Gebru 2007). 
Once in power, the EPRDF introduced several policy 
changes in the organization of the Ethiopian State and 
state-society relations. During the incumbency of the 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) that lasted 
between 1991 and 1995, several reforms were introduced 
based on principles of federalism, liberal political and 
socio-economic policy directions, and primacy of ethnic 
rights to self-determination. One of the important 
moves in this regard was the establishment of ethno-
linguistically constituted regional state governments and 
sub-regional administrations. Signaling the end of the 
transitional period, a new constitution that ushered in the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE 1995) was 
promulgated reaffirming the institutions of governance 
and major policy directions of the transitional period. 
The constitution emphasized that popular sovereignty 
and representation in the leading governance organs at 
various levels shall be exercised through direct popular 
participation in socio-economic and political processes 
including through periodic multiparty competitive 
elections. 
3.2  Major Governance 
Structures
The three major branches of government and the 
associated structures are instituted at the national 
and sub-national levels based on the principles of 
decentralized governance. The constitution provided for 
devolved powers and functions to nine regional states 
and two autonomous city administrations, the totality 
of which constitutes the Ethiopian federal system. As a 
first step towards entrenching decentralized governance 
by way of devolution, the establishment of two levels 
of parliamentary government at federal and regional 
levels, which was later extended to the local (district) 
administrations in 2001/02, was legally sanctioned. 
Accordingly, governance structures ranging from the 
federal to the grassroots levels were laid in descending 
order of hierarchy. Moreover, each regional state is 
empowered to enact a constitution of its own in a 
manner that strictly conforms to the intents and spirit 
of the federal constitution that stipulated the sharing of 
powers and functions between national and sub-national 
levels of governments. 
Accordingly, a federal bicameral legislature comprising 
the House of Peoples’ Representatives and the House 
of Federation was formed. Members of both houses are 
elected for a five-year term without limitation on their 
tenure in so long as they are reelected. The constitution 
stipulated that the House of People’s Representatives 
is the highest organ of state power with wide-ranging 
prerogatives: confirming the nomination of the top 
federal officials, approving proposed bills as laws, 
endorsing the national budget, ratifying bilateral and 
international treaties, discharging oversight functions, 
and declaring a state of emergency and/or war. On the 
other hand, the House of the Federation is empowered 
to serve as a constitutional court dealing with disputes 
between the federal and regional governments and 
between the regional states, determine the bases 
and sources of revenue of the federal and regional 
governments, and decide on issues of the right to self-
determination whenever the need arises. Sub-national 
legislatures formed at regional, local and grassroots levels 
are organized as unicameral legislative assemblies to 
undertake functions that are more or less similar to the 
ones carried out by the federal House of Representatives 
particularly with regard to approving appointment 
of officials in the respective leading bodies, exercise 
oversight functions, approve plans and budgets, etc. 
With the exception of the regional state councils that 
are empowered to formulate their constitutions in 
conformity with the federal constitution, sub-regional 
legislative councils do not engage in law making. In 
the overwhelming majority of the regional states, 
intermediate tiers of administration known as zones 
are created to undertake functions of liaising between 
regional and local governments by carrying out routine 
coordinating and administrative activities and providing 
technical support to local governments.
The executive branch at all levels is organized in a 
manner that is characteristic of most parliamentary 
systems where a party or coalition of parties controlling 
the majority of seats in the  legislative councils are entitled 
to form regional, local and grassroots administrations. 
The federal executive is organized under the leadership 
of a prime minister nominated by the party or coalition 
of parties controlling the majority of seats in the federal 
House of Representatives. The constitution also provides 
for election of a non-executive president who serves as 
a titular head of state following his/her nomination by 
the House of Representatives and elected by a two-thirds 
majority of both chambers in joint session. The term of 
office of the prime minister is unlimited whereas that 
of the president is for six years per term limited to two 
terms. While the prime minister is allowed to retain his 
parliamentary seat, a member of parliament elected as 
president is required to vacate his/her parliamentary 
seat following his/her appointment. The process follows 
a similar trajectory, albeit with some modifications, as 
regards the formation of sub-national executive branches. 
In a similar vein, the judicial system is organized at federal, 
regional, zonal, and local levels. Both federal and regional 
courts have different hierarchies of court systems vested 
with varying degrees of jurisdiction and competence. 
There are also Sharia courts whose jurisdiction is limited 
to family and related matters arising between litigants 
professing Islam provided that they are willing to be 
adjudicated by them.
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3.3  Democracy and Elections 
in Theory and Practice
Following the 1991 regime change, several local, 
regional and national parliamentary elections have taken 
place. The May 1991 regime change ushered in significant 
changes in the body politic of Ethiopia as enshrined in 
the Transitional Charter (TGE 1991) and the subsequent 
constitution (FDRE 1995) both of which recognized the 
inviolability of human rights, the rights of Ethiopia’s ethnic 
groups to self-determination, and citizens’ unabridged 
freedom of speech, association and assembly. The 
Transitional Charter, the constitution and other laws (TGE 
1992, FDRE 2002) ensured decentralization of power from 
the political center to the ethnically-constituted regions 
and below. 
Official policies and rhetoric aside, EPRDF controls not 
only all branches of government at the federal level but 
also all the constituent regions and local and grassroots 
administrative units of government. This is expedited 
through the strong presence of the constituent members 
of EPRDF in the four major regions plus ethnic-based 
regional parties affiliated to EPRDF in the remaining five 
regions. Besides, the two autonomous chartered cities 
of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa are placed under the 
Federal Government, which in effect puts them under 
the ruling political Front thereby making its total control 
of the public realm complete. EPRDF’s pervasive control 
is thus effected through closely-knit party structures that 
facilitate its quest for prevailing in the periodic elections. 
Thus, in all regional and local elections conducted in the 
country to date, EPRDF’s member organizations have 
prevailed thus elevating it to omnipotence2 . In instances 
where opposition parties claimed electoral victory, as 
was the case during the May 2005 Elections, second-
rounds were held on the orders of the National Election 
Board resulting in the victory of EPRDF and its affiliates. 
Attempts made to challenge electoral processes and 
outcomes in the courts of law proved futile due to the 
alleged partisanship, lack of independence and integrity, 
and subservience of the electoral body and the judicial 
system to EPRDF. The results of the May 2010 Elections 
are indicative of the absolute preponderance of the ruling 
party as signified by its winning of 99.6% of the seats (NEB 
2010) in the federal and regional legislatures. Given that 
policy and other major decisions with far-reaching socio-
economic and political implications are approved by the 
House of Representatives following initial scrutiny in the 
EPRDF-dominated Council of Ministers, the formidable 
leverage that EPRDF commands to the detriment of other 
political groups is too clear to beg for further elaboration. 
3.4  Non-State Actors
The role and influence of chiefdoms and other 
traditional centers of power on policy were abolished 
following the revolutionary upsurge of the mid-1970s 
spearheaded by the military government, which enacted 
a proclamation that provided for public ownership of 
land (PMAC 1975). These moves were retained by EPRDF 
after its ousting of military rule in 1991. Similarly and 
in spite of the several changes experienced over time 
since their genesis, the roles and modus operandi of 
Ethiopian traditional voluntary associations (such as 
traditional burial associations –idir- and saving and 
credit groups -iqub-) essentially remained unchanged 
in terms of scope of engagement and mandate whereby 
their preoccupation remained limited to catering for the 
needs of their members without transforming their fields 
of activities and organizational profile (Kassahun 2007). 
Hence the influence of non-state actors and institutions 
on policy including agricultural policy is virtually absent. 
The advent of modern civil society organizations 
dates back only to Ethiopia’s liberation from the brief 
Italian occupation in 1941 during which they were at 
a nascent stage in terms of capacity, scope and areas 
of engagement, and geographic distribution (Kassahun 
2002). Hence during the years that preceded the 1974 
revolution, formally organized modern CSOs were very 
few in number mainly characterized by ecumenical 
in orientation, foreign-based in terms of origin, and 
engagement in addressing pressing needs of vulnerable 
groups by providing relief aid, educational and health 
services, and vocational training (ibid). Between the 
mid-1970s and mid-1980s, modern NGOs proliferated 
due to major famine episodes that prompted a massive 
influx of foreign-based organizations that induced the 
formation of some local counterparts. In view of the 
fact that coping with the unfolding humanitarian crisis 
was beyond the capacity and preparedness of the state, 
the military regime allowed the intervention of foreign 
NGOs to deal with threats of drought and food insecurity 
(Dessalegn 2002: 106). 
In the aftermath of EPRDF’s coming to power, formal 
civil society organisations mushroomed in a manner 
unprecedented hitherto due to the increasingly widening 
trend of the public space, which was expressed in the 
formation of several professional associations, NGOs, and 
private sector operators. In this manner the landscape 
of citizens’ associations was transformed in several 
respects like spatial distribution, fields of engagement, 
and diversification of activities. Nevertheless, Ethiopian 
CSOs continued to heavily depend on external support 
in various ways due to their inability to survive on their 
own. Efforts to ameliorate this shortcoming by reducing 
the magnitude of dependence of Ethiopian CSOs were 
nonetheless constrained by a plethora of economic and 
socio-cultural and political factors that prevailed in the 
Ethiopian context. Once the euphoria of liberalization 
subsided, the legal-administrative environment within 
which CSOs are required to operate has been marked by 
increased state control culminating in the promulgation 
of new legislation in 2009 (FDRE 2009), which stipulated 
that local CSOs that draw 10 % or less of their funding 
from external sources shall be classified as ‘Ethiopian 
Charities and Societies’ and made eligible to engage in 
political advocacy and rights-based issues and concerns. 
On the other hand, both local and foreign/international 
CSOs constituting the bulk of CSOs in Ethiopia – defined 
as those that receive more than 10% of their funds 
from non-domestic resources - are required to register 
as ‘Ethiopian Resident Charities and Societies” whose 
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involvement is legally limited to only service delivery and 
socio-economic development entailing their exclusion 
from engagement in advocacy aimed at influencing 
policy issues including agricultural policy. 
3.5.  Implications for 
Agricultural Policy 
making
The point of entry in the effort of unraveling the 
political economy of agricultural policy in Ethiopia is the 
organizational principles and operational practices of 
EPRDF. Once EPRDF’s monopoly of the public space was 
entrenched in the aforementioned manner, the ruling 
Front got added leverage by incorporating the major 
elements of its socio-economic and political programs 
as the major provisions of the 1995 constitution in whose 
drafting it played decisive roles. 
It should also be recalled that EPRDF’s cardinal 
principles anchored in its Marxist-Leninist past 
espousing the vanguard role of the party remained 
intact, albeit with some modifications that are in line 
with developments associated with the end of the Cold 
War. This is evidenced by its adherence to democratic 
centralism as enshrined in its organizational document 
(EPRDF 2006) emphasizing  the ruling party’s centrality 
in spearheading socio-economic and political processes 
on the one hand and blending the structures of party 
and state on the other. Aalen (2002) argued that EPRDF’s 
centralized party structure runs counter to the intents 
and spirits of the federal and regional constitutions due to 
the entrenchment of upward accountability to the higher 
party organs to the detriment of downward accountability. 
As a result, the constitutional rights of the self-governing 
ethnic regions in formulating and implementing policies 
under the rubric of arrangements aimed at entrenching 
formal decentralization are subordinated to the decisions 
and programmatic positions of EPRDF, i.e. centralization 
of power in practice. 
 
Public policy making in today’s Ethiopia is 
characterized by top-down approaches in the major areas 
of political governance, socio-economic development, 
and sub-national levels of administration despite 
EPRDF’s official pledges favoring popular initiatives and 
participation in decision making. Dessalegn (2008: 147) 
opined that there is still a lot to be desired regarding 
the policy formulation process given that existing state 
of affairs tends to forfeit the advantages accruing from 
broad-based consultation. Besides, EPRDF’s omnipotence 
in policy making is boosted through the façade of its 
uninterrupted victories in all the electoral exercises 
conducted since 1991. Its unbridled powers in decision-
making are cemented by the different provisions of 
the incumbent constitution that empower the federal 
government to formulate and implement overall 
economic, social and development policies (Article 51). 
This is buttressed by empowering the EPRDF-dominated 
House of Peoples’ Representatives to legislate in all matters 
falling under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
(Article 55, 2a) implying that constitutional principles 
that provide for institutional checks and balances and 
legislative oversight over the EPRDF-dominated executive 
have limited practical impact. Hence the preoccupation 
of parliament is confined to rubberstamping the 
decisions and proposals of the executive branch due 
to the legislature’s predetermination of steadfastly 
supporting proposed bills without adequate scrutiny 
and debate (Kassahun 2005).
National policy including agricultural policy that 
falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government 
is initiated in the EPRDF Council in which each member 
organization of the four major constituent regional 
parties3  is represented by 15 elected persons. Following 
consultations in the EPRDF Council and its Executive 
Committee at regular and extraordinary meetings, 
decision is often reached through consensus. In the 
absence of consensus, adherence to the principles of 
democratic centralism that underlines the binding nature 
of party discipline whereby the position supported by 
the majority and the higher echelons is strictly observed. 
Following this, draft policies that are agreed on at this 
level are channeled to the Council of Ministers chaired by 
the Prime Minister who is also the chairperson of EPRDF. 
The Council of Ministers, almost all of whose members 
are leading members of EPRDF and those of the affiliated 
ruling parties of the five “emerging” regions4 , approves 
the same which then is submitted as a draft bill to the 
House of People’s Representatives for approval. The 
process of approving draft bills by the regional and local 
legislatures (councils) also follows a similar trajectory. 
Noteworthy also is that it is incumbent on the regional 
states to comply with national policies that are within 
the purview of the powers of the federal government. 
The absence of a strong and viable loyal opposition as 
a countervailing force has thus provided EPRDF with a 
free hand and unconstrained space for legally enforcing 
its wills and preferences, which facilitates conditions for 
embarking on the task of transforming the performance 
of agriculture in a manner that it deems necessary and 
appropriate. In the light of the foregoing, therefore, it 
is hardly possible to envisage possibilities for debating 
on and promoting alternative policy choices given the 
neutralization of non-state actors, the dismal situation 
of opposition parties, and the absence of traditional and 
other forms of viable power centers outside the EPRDF 
mainstream. 
Whilst EPRDF’s apparent hegemony in all areas of 
politics undoubtedly does have negative impacts on the 
quality of policy making, in the realm of agricultural policy 
making its negative impacts are at least in part counter-
acted by the continuing insecurity of the EPRDF regime 
(resounding election victories notwithstanding) and by 
its acknowledged need to generate broad-based growth 
in order to control the consolidation of opposition forces. 
The final section of the paper examines the agricultural 
extension program in Ethiopia, which neatly illustrates 
that both  political and economic drivers result in shaping 
agricultural policy in the country.
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4.		 Agricultural	Extension	
Program	in	Ethiopia:	
Political	and	Economic	
Drivers
Though agricultural extension programs formed 
a major component of agricultural policy during the 
reigns of both the imperial government and military rule, 
the priority attached to investment in extension grew 
by leaps and bounds in the post-1991 years following 
the formulation of the Agricultural Development-Led 
Industrialization Strategy (ADLI). Whilst the government’s 
claim of endeavoring to bring about economic recovery 
through implementing ADLI and the agricultural 
extension program focusing on smallholder agriculture 
is not questioned, this section also sets out to shed 
light on the political dimension of the program and 
its contribution to the EPRDF’s quest for control and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, there may be tensions between 
the two objectives, with the control imperative leading to 
a less flexible and responsive service for farmers, thereby 
reducing its productivity and growth impacts.
4.1  Agricultural Extension 
during the Reigns of the 
Imperial and Military 
Regimes  			
Agricultural extension has always been at the center 
of policies pertaining to the sector during the reigns of 
successive Ethiopian governments. A historical survey of 
the agricultural extension system in the country (Belay 
2003, Berhanu et al 2006) reveals that it has been at the 
forefront of agricultural development drives for the 
last several decades since government-led agricultural 
extension services commenced in the 1950s. The Alemaya 
[later renamed Haromaya] College of Agriculture and 
Mechanical Arts, that had links with Oklahoma University 
in the US, was the first to be entrusted with the task 
of reaching out to farming communities by providing 
extension services and disseminating research-based 
knowledge and adult education (Davis et al. 2010: 
8). When the Ministry of Agriculture of the imperial 
government was established in 1963, it was given the 
mandate for providing extension services as a result 
of which it established departments responsible for 
agricultural extension both at the Ministry and its branch 
offices (Habtemariam 2007). Between the late-1950s 
and 1960s, the imperial government developed three 
successive Five-Year National Development Plans (1957-
1962, 1962-1967, and 1968-1973, respectively). 
The first two Five-Year Plans heavily favored large-
scale farms specializing in the production of export 
crops whereas the Third (1968-1973) exhibited a major 
departure from the previous ones by recognizing the need 
for transforming smallholder production by focusing 
on localities that were endowed with high production 
factors (Dejene 1990: 50). This move culminated in the 
establishment of the Chilalo Agricultural Development 
Unit (CADU) and the Wolaita Agricultural Development 
Unit (WADU), among others, in today’s Oromia and 
Southern Regional States respectively. (Yonas 2006a: 
174). These were formed to facilitate the provision 
of technological packages in the form of improved 
seeds, fertilizer and credit, and to assist in building 
human and physical infrastructure development 
and soil conservation (Yonas 2006b: 29). Agricultural 
extension was classified into what came to be known 
as the Comprehensive Package Approach (CPA) and the 
Minimum Package Approach (MPA) both of which were 
mainly donor-driven targeting wealthy smallholders and 
those engaged in commercial agriculture (Berhanu et al 
2006). Whereas both CPA and MPA focused on increasing 
production as a means of improving the standard of living 
of smallholders, the Comprehensive Package Approach 
was implemented by organizing groups of farmers who 
were targeted to benefit from research-based knowledge 
and application of improved inputs. On the other 
hand, the Minimum Package Approach was designed 
to address similar goals by taking individual farming 
households as beneficiaries from similar interventions 
(Davis et al 2010: 8). The progress in realizing increased 
production through implementation of these package 
approaches under imperial rule was bedeviled by 
structural constraints like the land tenure system, 
which was characterized by high incidence of tenancy, 
that inhibited efforts aimed at lending durability and 
progressive and incremental expansion of the initiative. 
However, through their representatives that wielded 
immense powers in the mainstream political organs of 
the imperial establishment, the landlords in the different 
parts of the country blocked each and every attempt 
aimed at reforming the tenure system5 . 
Under military rule, implementation of the Minimum 
Package Approach temporarily became the focus of 
agricultural extension with support from the World 
Bank, IFAD and SIDA6 . This approach later assumed a new 
nomenclature, the Peasant Agricultural Development 
Extension Program (PADEP), which was also supported 
by foreign donors. Nevertheless, agricultural policy in 
the immediate aftermath of the demise of imperial 
rule focused more on implementing the Land Reform 
Proclamation than on promoting agricultural extension 
(Davis et al 2010: 8). Moreover, given the limited number 
of extension workers and lack of financial and other forms 
of incentives, PADEP failed in terms of achieving stated 
objectives (Befekadu and Berhanu 2000: 185). Instead, 
agricultural development priorities anchored in the 
ideological orientation of the military government that 
accorded primacy to cooperatives and state farms led to 
a situation whereby individual peasant producers were 
largely deprived of access to credit services and improved 
inputs7 . Hence efforts made during the reigns of both the 
imperial and military regimes in expediting agricultural 
development proved futile (Tesfaye 1999: 134). 
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4.2  Agricultural Extension 
under EPRDF 
Under EPRDF, smallholders became the focus of 
interventions in agriculture in general and in regard 
to agricultural extension in particular. In doing so, the 
regime initially received support for the agricultural 
extension scheme from smallholders who hoped to 
get preferential access to agricultural inputs and other 
related services presumed to lead to improvement of 
their lots. The first four years of EPRDF rule (1991-1995) 
were marked by the resumption of PADEP. At the same 
time a pilot extension system supported by Sasakawa 
Global 2000 (SG-2000) was introduced in 1993, involving 
160 farmers in demonstration exercises focusing on maize 
and wheat production. The number of participating 
farmers grew tenfold by 1994 with the establishment 
of additional demonstration sites engaged in sorghum 
and teff production (Berhanu et al 2006). The success 
of the SG-2000 scheme, resulting in a boom harvest in 
1995, prompted the government to adopt agricultural 
extension as a national intervention strategy and a major 
component of ADLI. Based on this, a new extension 
programme, the Participatory Demonstration and 
Training Extension System (PADETES), was introduced. 
During the launching of PADETES, the government 
declared that the objective of this approach was to 
enhance the productivity, production capacity and 
empowerment of smallholders with a view to ensuring 
prospects for national food self-sufficiency, increase the 
volume and variety of industrial raw materials (primary 
products), and producing for the export market (EEA, 
2004/05).
Under the PADETES scheme, one extension team was 
deployed for each of the three agricultural production 
zones, namely those with abundant moisture, moisture-
deficit areas, and pastoral rangelands. The number of 
smallholder farmers who participated in the PADETES 
scheme increased from 32,000 in 1995 to about 4.2 
million in 2002 whereas the number of deployed 
extension workers increased from 2500 in 1995 to about 
15,000 in 2002 implying that about one third of all farmers 
participated in PADETES, whilst the development agent 
to farmer ratio had risen from 1: 5000 to 1:800 (ibid). 
In 2004 the government embarked on a further 
ambitious expansion of the extension system in the 
country. Central to this were the establishment of 
Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and 
Training colleges (ATVETs) to train a new cadre of extension 
workers and the establishment of farmer training centres 
(FTCs) to become the focal point of extension support 
in every kebele in the country. Between 2004 and 2009, 
these farmer training programs received a significant 
annual public investment amounting to over US $ 50 
million or almost 2% of agricultural GDP (Spielman et 
al 2010). According to Roseboom (cited in ibid), the 
investment earmarked for the program is in excess of 
those made in other developing countries.
As of recently, agricultural extension is geared towards 
developing various packages that are suited to the 
different agro-ecological zones where both smallholder 
and large-scale agricultural activities are undertaken. 
According to Dessalegn (2008: 159), whereas the initial 
focus was on food crops, the extension system at a later 
stage developed packages that are redefined to fit to 
the conditions of the different agro-ecological zones 
including the dry land areas. The packages developed in 
line with this include those dealing with high-value crops 
(spices, oilseeds, vegetables), livestock (dairy, poultry, 
beekeeping, fattening), and natural resources (forestry 
and soil and water conservation). 
Thus, investment in agricultural extension has been a 
key component of the government’s strategy to promote 
smallholder agricultural growth for almost two decades. 
There is indeed some evidence of its beneficial impact. 
For example, drawing on a 15-year longitudinal data set 
on households in 15 Ethiopian villages compiled since 
1994, Dercon et al (2008) found that public investment 
in improved road quality and increased extension 
services indeed contributed to the lowering of poverty 
and to increasing rural consumption. The same source 
stated that access to all-weather roads reduces poverty 
by 6.9 percentage points and raises consumption by 
16.3 percent. This notwithstanding, however, many 
smallholder farmers are hesitant to embrace the use of 
modern inputs particularly when access to these is based 
on credit due to the tendency of farmers to avoid risk in 
instances of crop failure (Carleson et al 2005).
The discourse on the positive ramifications of 
agricultural extension in Ethiopia was primarily 
spearheaded by the bureaucratic elite and the agricultural 
research institutes that are engaged in facilitating 
increased production and productivity under the aegis 
of the federal and regional governments. Sections of 
the technocratic elite in particular advocated the use 
of green-revolution technologies to solve problems of 
low productivity and food insecurity in Ethiopia (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2000). This move was also supported by 
economists who invoked relevant experiences and data 
from elsewhere. The Ethiopian government in general 
and the Prime Minister who is the Chairman of EPRDF 
in particular invested substantial political capital on 
the scheme by promising to ‘cross the divide’ to food 
self-sufficiency (ibid) as expressed in applauding the 
success of the SG-2000 initiative marked by the 1995 
bumper harvest. The government’s resolve was thus 
strengthened to aggressively expedite the agricultural 
extension program whose efficacy was appreciated by 
multilateral and bilateral donors like the World Bank, 
European Union, UK, Canada, AfDB, Ireland, Germany 
and Sweden (Getachew 2007: 103). In this connection, 
Driscoll et al (2005) stated that Ethiopia received about 
44% of its annual government budget from Overseas 
Development assistance (ODA) between 2002/03 and 
2004/05. Of this, 31% was disbursed in the form of direct 
budget support, much of it channeled for boosting 
agricultural development.
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4.3  Agricultural Extension as 
a Means of Control over 
Smallholder Producers
Until 1992 when liberalization reforms were 
introduced, state monopoly over the fertilizer market was 
controlled by the state-owned Agricultural Input Supply 
Enterprise (Yonas 2006b: 49-50). Liberalization, however, 
amounted to a mere pretension given that four out of 
the six companies involved in the sale and distribution of 
fertilizers were owned by EPRDF’s member organizations 
(Befekadu and Berhanu 2000: 190; Abera 2001: 102). At 
a later stage, the two non-EPRDF private companies 
were pushed out under duress thereby enabling the 
ruling party’s firms to monopolize the fertilizer market 
(Abegaz 2011: 52). According to Jayne et al, (2003), new 
agricultural technologies and liberalization reforms in 
fertilizer marketing actually resulted in government 
control of pricing and distribution of agricultural inputs, 
which entailed the exit of private operators from similar 
engagements. In view of the fact that the majority of 
smallholder farmers cannot pay cash for improved inputs 
they receive, extending credit to producers was deemed 
necessary as one of the components of the extension 
program. According to one informant8 , the precondition 
for Farmers’ eligibility in accessing agricultural credit was 
to be organized in formally recognized cooperatives or 
to form credit and saving groups under the guidance of 
extension workers.  
This mechanism of organizing producers was designed 
to form the basis of collateral for ensuring repayment of 
credits and the interest and administrative costs accruing 
thereof as per the terms enshrined in the contracts. After 
receiving inputs on credit, each beneficiary of the service 
is required to repay his/her share of the debt during each 
harvest season through the respective cooperative/
group leaders assisted by extension workers and 
grassroots (kebele) administrations (Yonas 2006b: 51). In 
several instances, defaulting smallholders in general and 
those suspected of sympathizing with the opposition in 
particular are forced to sell their oxen and other assets to 
settle their debts9 . Even though data on average default 
figures and whether the politically loyal smallholders 
being preferentially treated are not available, Ayelegn 
and Shirega (2000: 26) cited several instances when 
several farmers were forced to sell oxen in order to settle 
their debts while the properties of others were auctioned. 
Moreover, official government and ruling-party sources 
(EPRDF 1999 and 2000 and FDRE 2001 cited in Demessie 
2006: 217-218) mentioned the growing unwillingness 
and inability of peasant producers to repay loans incurred 
as a result of credit-based acquisition of modern inputs 
as a serious concern thereby indicating problems that 
underlie the situation of smallholder production.
Government monopoly was also experienced 
as regards the production, sale and distribution of 
improved seeds that are one of the major elements 
of the agricultural extension program. According to 
Befekadu and Berhanu (2000: 192), a government-
owned firm known as the Ethiopian Improved Seeds 
Enterprise is in charge of distributing 93 % of the 
improved seeds despite the regime’s alleged introduction 
of liberalization measures. Some studies indicated that 
several inadequacies underlie the adaptation of the 
seed-fertilizer and technological diffusion arrangement 
resulting in high cost of inputs, insufficient credit services 
and rationing, and lack of varieties that are appropriate 
to farmers’ needs (EEA/EEPRI cited in Spielman et al 
2010). Habtemariam (2008: 166-171) enumerated 
the challenges that bedevil the Ethiopian agricultural 
extension system from the point of view of technical 
inadequacies and absence of participation of non-state 
actors like NGOs and other citizens’ groups. Based on 
his study on the supply of credit-based agricultural 
inputs in the Amhara regional state, Yonas (2006b: 
66) stated that the agricultural extension programme 
compels farmers to excessively depend on providers 
that are either state enterprises or those affiliated to the 
regional ruling party. According to one informant10 , the 
situation is similar in the other regional states as well. In 
view of the foregoing, therefore, it can be argued that 
the taking effect of the aforementioned monopolistic 
structure results in double-pronged consequences. 
Economically, the aforementioned firms benefit from a 
high profit margin on the one hand and elevate access to 
agricultural inputs to the status of instrument of political 
control and patronage on the other (Yonas 2006a: 166). 
In view of this, I argue that access to agricultural inputs 
like improved seeds and chemical fertilizers including 
agricultural credit being among the major components 
of the agricultural extension scheme in Ethiopia, 
government monopoly over these lends added leverage 
to the EPRDF-led political establishment to command 
unbridled control over the smallholder producer in the 
absence of alternative providers.
4.4  Political and Economic 
Underpinnings of the 
Agricultural Extension 
Scheme
The central argument advanced in this study is that 
despite the legitimate and sound economic rationales 
advanced justifying agricultural extension, there are 
credible grounds for asserting that the venture is also 
driven by the urge for advancing political imperatives. 
As mentioned earlier, there is no doubt that the 
government is committed to bringing about economic 
recovery through agricultural transformation by 
working towards improved performance of smallholder 
production  whose positive ramifications are beyond 
contention.  On the other hand, EPRDF is also equally 
interested in perpetuating itself by securing votes and 
broader acceptance. It also worthy to note that under 
the circumstances in which it finds itself at present, its 
chosen means of doing this is by entrenching political 
control and patronage. 
Hence the agricultural extension program is driven by 
these twin economic and political objectives. The central 
role in expediting the agricultural extension scheme in a 
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manner that meets the objectives for which it is designed 
is played by agricultural extension agents deployed in 
all the rural areas of the country. Moreover, selected 
smallholder farmers who participate in agriculture-
related trainings on thousands of demonstration sites 
and Farmer Training Centers also play supportive roles 
to the endeavors of extension workers in this regard. 
The extension agents whose estimated number is 45,812 
(Davis et al, 2010: 15) work in tandem with farmers 
trained in FTCs that they run in collusion with grassroots 
administrations with funding from local governments. 
Spielman et al (2006) stated that each FTC is designed 
to be staffed by three extension agents each of whom 
undertake tasks related to crop production, livestock, 
and natural resource management.   
Trained agricultural extension workers are spread in all 
the regional states of the Ethiopian Federation. According 
to informants who served as ex-directors and instructors11 
of ATVETs, some training institutes currently under the 
federal Ministry will provisionally stay where they are until 
the concerned regions develop the necessary capacity 
to take them over. Following this, the regions will be 
in charge exercising devolved powers and functions by 
way of facilitating administrative expedience and easing 
concentration of tasks at the centre. It is envisaged that the 
role of the Federal Ministry will be limited to facilitating 
and coordinating activities when this is ultimately 
realized (Yonas 2006a: 175). As aforementioned, the 
fact that all sub-national level government structures 
fall under the jurisdiction of member organizations of the 
ruling Front ensures that decentralizing the management 
of the training institutes does not entail a situation that 
undermines the imperatives of control.
Admission to the training institutes is formally based 
on pass grades obtained in the national entrance 
exams prepared by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture. 
Eligible applicants who sit for the exams are required to 
complete 10th grade in the regular high schools. Short-
listing and selecting qualified candidates is undertaken 
by regional government officials on the basis of quotas 
allocated to each. It was learnt that all applicants who 
meet all the requirements for admission cannot join 
the Technical and Vocational Education and Training 
(TVET) institutes due to shortage of space and limited 
quota. Formally, preferential treatment is given on the 
basis of gender and residence in the peripheral regions 
through affirmative action. However, interviewees 
explained that in practice additional criteria like political 
allegiance and loyalty, including subjective evaluation 
that takes into account commitment to the program, is 
also applied to discriminate among those that are short-
listed. Based on their personal experiences, informants 
added that subjective considerations like commitment 
to the programme that cannot be easily measured are 
often attributed to selecting from among short- listed 
candidates that is often tilted in favour of those who 
are enlisted as members of EPRDF. Consequently, the 
additional points ranging between 15% and 25% of the 
total weighted average that members and sympathizers 
of the EPRDF receive on this basis makes them enjoy 
comparative advantages over other competitors to join 
the agricultural training institutes. 
It was also reported that those who undertake the 
screening at various levels are largely believed to be 
members of the ruling party operating on the basis of 
standing instructions to this effect and are made aware 
of who among the candidates are members of the 
ruling party or not through various means. Following 
their admission, the successful candidates pursue their 
trainings for a period of three years after which they 
obtain diplomas in various agricultural disciplines. 
Following their graduation, extension workers are 
employed by the regional governments and deployed 
to the rural areas and charged with the responsibility of 
undertaking the aforementioned activities pertaining 
to their specialization and beyond.  To date, tens of 
thousands of male and female extension workers have 
graduated while tens of thousands are currently in the 
pipeline. According to the various informants, about 
10% of the graduates have left their jobs as extension 
workers in search of greener pastures elsewhere and 
secured employment in other organizations after 
serving as extension agents for a number of years. It is 
also reported that not all graduates continue to serve as 
extension workers indefinitely. Hundreds have changed 
their careers to serve in the local, zonal, regional, and 
federal government organs as administrators, sector 
office heads, legislators, and experts.
The engagement of extension workers in 
non-extension activities like administration, tax 
collection, and popularization of policies including 
those that are not directly related to agriculture 
(Berhanu et al, 2006) provide clues that they could also 
be involved in mobilizing votes in favor of the ruling 
party during elections. Belay (2002 cited in Fisseha 2009: 
30) stated that the involvement of extension workers 
in non-extension activities led to the undermining of 
their credibility and reputation whereby many people 
tended to view them as government prolocutors rather 
than facilitators of agricultural development endeavours. 
According to Fisseha (ibid), this posed difficulties for 
extension workers to win the confidence and cooperation 
of farming communities who tend to view them as 
bureaucrats and politicians with little concern for the 
needs and preferences of local people. A study by Fasil 
and Habtemariam (2006) on the state of agricultural 
extension service in Ethiopia brought to light that about 
87% and 46% of the interviewed extension workers 
stated that they were involved in credit repayment 
processes and tax collection respectively and admitted 
that “in some cases they play advocacy role in the interest 
of the ruling party”. The involvement of extension workers 
in some non-extension activities is thus indicative of the 
fact that they engage in tasks that enhance the interests 
of the ruling party since they are regular government 
employees working under a situation where the blending 
of party and state structures is the norm at present. 
This assertion is plausible in view of the fact that the 
recruitment, employment and deployment of extension 
workers are undertaken by regional governments whose 
leading institutions and officials are integral parts of the 
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EPRDF political establishment. The instrumentality of the 
extension system to preserve the overriding interests 
of EPRDF can also be ascertained by the fact that the 
policy formulation process pertaining to the program is 
underpinned by top-down approaches under the aegis 
of the ruling Front. It is, therefore, highly likely that the 
agricultural extension program is designed in line with 
the quest to further the interests of the government 
and the ruling party along lines that are in accord with 
predetermined preferences of officialdom. In this vein, 
Belay (2002) argues that policies associated with the 
agricultural extension program are often developed 
and take effect without due regard to the preference 
and opinion of farmers. 
In the light of the aforementioned, understanding 
the increasingly unprecedented intrusive power of the 
EPRDF regime is noteworthy. Dessalegn (2009) compares 
the situation of state control under the three successive 
regimes, namely imperial rule, the military government 
and EPRDF stating that the military government 
extended the intrusive powers of the state far more 
than its predecessor partly due to establishing Peasant 
Associations and mass organizations operating in the 
rural areas. These proved more effective in penetrating 
society more than the disparate semi-public agents 
under imperial rule. Moreover, the military dictatorship 
used the centralized Leninist party structure that 
replaced the administrative apparatus of the imperial 
regime at all levels by extending party membership to 
Peasant Association leaders and grassroots communities. 
This was further reinforced by deploying rural extension 
workers where one agent was assigned to undertake 
multiple tasks in at least 5 Peasant Associations. The 
same source asserts that the degree and extent of the 
intrusive power of  the EPRDF surpassed even that of 
the military dictatorship in several respects, which 
is expedited through considerable increase in the 
number of extension workers deployed, replacement 
of grassroots administrations and associated organs 
and structures by cabinets, councils, and administrative 
managers including committees and teams dealing with 
development, mobilization, service provisioning, security, 
and more importantly party functionaries and cells 
deployed in villages and neighborhoods. The overarching 
presence of extension workers at the level of each and 
every rural community working in tandem with farmers 
graduating from FTCs and grassroots administrative and 
party structures spread over villages and neighborhoods 
of rural Ethiopia, therefore, makes scrutiny and control of 
state of affairs down to the household level increasingly 
complete. 
4.5  State-Donor Relations 
with regard to 
Agricultural Extension
If the state is to use extension policy for objectives 
of domestic political control, then it must also be able 
to exert its control over extension policy in its dealings 
with international development partners. Above I noted 
that there has been support for investment in extension 
from multilateral, bilateral and other donors throughout 
the EPRDF period. Prominent amongst these have been 
World Bank, SG-2000 and IFAD. However, I argue that 
donor support has never allowed them to dictate the 
terms of extension policy to the EPRDF government.
The best example of this concerns the role of the 
private sector in provision of extension and other 
complementary services, e.g. seed and fertilizer supply. 
Starting in the late 1990s, a number of donors encouraged 
the government to allow a greater role for the private 
sector in agricultural input markets. Keeley and Scoones 
(2000) report the inaugural meeting, in 1997, of a 
so-called Agribusiness Forum that brought together 
donors (including World Bank, SG-2000 and USAID), 
government ministers, multinational companies and 
domestic private operators to deliberate on the issue of 
involving the private sector in agriculture in partnership 
with the government. The meeting was co-hosted by the 
Prime Minister and SG-2000 and was chaired by Jimmy 
Carter. However, in the five years following this meeting, 
the position of the Ethiopian government hardened 
against private sector participation, as illustrated above 
in relation to the reversal of fertilizer market liberalization. 
This position has not changed over the past decade.
More generally, Keeley and Scoones (2000, p100) cite 
an official in a bilateral donor agency as saying that, 
following the decision to upscale the SG-2000 pilot 
scheme in the late 1990s, extension policy is `the one 
policy we can’t do anything about’.
In early 2009, in an apparent opening up to greater 
policy dialogue with donors, the Ethiopian Government 
requested the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
undertake a review of the country’s agricultural extension 
programme. This aimed at identifying the strengths 
and constraints of the agricultural extension system 
and provide “best fit” solutions and indicate scaling-up 
opportunities for improvement (Davis et al 2009:1). 
Following this, the Foundation deployed a team of 
professionals specializing in agricultural extension and 
international management that undertook the review 
between May and July 2009. At the conclusion of the 
formal review process, a three-day stakeholder workshop 
was held for eliciting feedback and inputs from a group 
of over 80 parliamentarians, Ministry of Agriculture staff, 
and frontline extension workers. One of the outcomes 
of this process was the establishment in 2011 of the 
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA), which aims to 
give renewed impetus to policies supporting smallholder 
agriculture in the country, in particular reforms to the 
extension system that respond to the weaknesses 
identified in the diagnostic study. The establishment of 
the ATA is a recognition of the limitations of the Ministry 
of Agriculture to undertake these tasks. However, whilst 
donors are providing technical and financial support 
to ATA, ultimate control remains in the government’s 
hands, with the Prime Minister himself chairing the ATA 
board. I understand that, despite high-level discussion 
regarding the role of the private sector in providing 
agricultural support services in the country, there has 
been no movement in government policy on this issue 
since the establishment of ATA.
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In the light of the foregoing, I argue that both the 
outcomes of the Foundation’s review process and the 
initiatives attempted by other donors like USAID has 
left the uncontested control of the government on the 
Ethiopian agricultural extension system largely intact.  
Conclusion
The ramifications of agricultural extension in Ethiopia 
are viewed from several angles. First, it has played an 
important role in augmenting smallholder production 
due to improved access to inputs, credits, and training. 
Second, the government persisted in implementing 
the extension program despite the hesitation of many 
smallholders to embrace credit-based services for fear 
of being indebted in cases of harvest failure. Third, the 
implementation of the program gained the support of 
donors of various persuasions that provided assistance 
prior to and following the commencement of the 
programme. Fourth, the government has invested a 
lot in the venture to advance closely intertwined socio-
economic and political goals. Fifth, extension workers who 
received relatively advanced technical and administrative 
training of various sorts are deployed en masse in all the 
rural areas to guide and oversee implementation of the 
programme in a manner that could lead to the attainment 
of the desired economic and political objectives. Sixth, 
the overarching presence and outreach of EPRDF that 
is embedded in closely-knit party and government 
structures enabled it to effectively penetrate the rural 
areas thereby facilitating political control that is vital to 
securing votes of grassroots communities constituting 
the overwhelming majority of the electorate. In 
conclusion, in as much as the attainment of economic 
recovery and food self-sufficiency is the genuine desire 
of the EPRDF regime, the implicit goal also includes 
obtaining legitimacy from smallholders whose support 
is crucial for winning elections and ensuring survival 
against internal and external threats. By and large, donor 
influence on agricultural policy is rather limited except 
in cases that donor interventions are commensurate 
with the preferences of the EPRDF regime as indicated 
with regard to the SG-2000 pilot scheme. The discussion 
on the political economy of agricultural policy making 
in Ethiopia has, therefore, both economic and political 
dimensions as presented in this paper.
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END NOTES
1 According to Dessalegn (2008; 134), the package 
approach was designed for application at group 
and household levels. In the case of households, 
the approach is based on family resources like land, 
labour, and other household assets including the 
capacity to produce where farmers are provided 
menu-based technologies to choose from and 
receive the necessary training and information for 
making informed decisions and choices. On the 
other hand,  20-30 households that are provided 
with either  a menu-based technological package 
or a minimum package linking research-extension 
and input-credit distribution are organized under 
the group-approach.
2   EPRDF has continuously controlled the four major 
regions (Tigray, Oromia, Amhara and the Southern 
Region) and the two autonomous city governments 
(Addis Ababa abd Dire Dawa) since 1991. The same 
applies to the remaining five regions (Afar, Beni-
Shangul Gumuz, Gambella, Harari and Somali) that 
are controlled by ethnic parties that are closely 
associated with EPRDF without being formally 
enlisted as members of the coalition.
3 These include the Tigray People’s Libertaion Front 
(TPLF), the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization 
(OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic 
Movement (ANDM), and the Southern Ethiopian 
Peoples’ Democratic Movement (SEPDM) that are 
the ruling political organizations in Tigray, Oromia, 
Amhara and Southern National/Regional States 
respectively.
4 Reference is made to the ruling parties in Afar, 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Harari and Somali 
regional states that are not formally members of 
the EPRDF-coalition. To date, the programmes and 
policy directions of these organizations on different 
issues and concerns have always remained identical 
with those of the ruling Front. Hence they are 
officially designated as “friendly” political 
organizations. These receive preferential treatment 
and support from the former resulting in their 
enjoying a dominant position over their adversaries 
in their respective areas as expressed in their 
repeated electoral victory as a result of which they 
managed to form the concerned regional/state 
governments under their jurisdiction. Regarding 
their role and participation in the policy making 
process, it is widely believed that they are consulted 
through their respective leaderships following 
which  they follow suit by subscribing to what has 
been already decided by EPRDF’s leadership. There 
is no instance where divergences on policy issues 
between these organizations and EPRDF have taken 
place to date. 
5  Interview with a former member of the Management 
of the Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit 
(CADU), 28 April 2011, Washington DC.
 6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. 
8   Interview with an agricultural extension team leader 
in Oromia Region, 10 March 2011, Zway, East Shoa 
Zone.
 9 Interview with anonymous smallholder farmer in 
East Shoa Zone of the Oromia Regional State, Mojo, 
8 March 2011. 
10 Interview with ex-Deputy Manager of an Agricultural 
Technical and Vocational Education Training 
Institute, 12 March 2011, Southern Regional State.
11  Interviews with the author at varying times in 
December 2010, Addis Ababa. 
Working Paper 042 www.future-agricultures.org
This Working Paper was written by Kassahun Berhanu for the Future Agricultures Consortium. The series editor is Beatrice Ouma. Further 
information about this series of Working Papers at: www. future-agricultures.org 
The Future Agricultures Consortium aims to encourage critical debate and policy dialogue on the future of agriculture in Africa. The Consortium 
is a partnership between research-based organisations across Africa and in the UK. Future Agricultures Consortium Secretariat at the University of 
Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RE  UK    T +44 (0) 1273 915670  E info@future-agricultures.org
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce material from Future Agricultures Briefi ngs in their own publications. In return, the Future Agricultures 
Consortium requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication.
FAC appreciates the support of the 
UK Department for International Development (DfID)
